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NATIONAL DEFENSE AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES
WILBUR G. KATZ*
I hope that I am not abusing your hospitality in speak-
ing seriously this noon upon a serious subject. After the
three days of meetings which you have diligently attended,
you deserve relaxation, if not entertainment. But this an-
nual meeting is held in serious times. Since you met at
Indianapolis last August, we have all been subjected to a
series of shocks which have jolted us out of our complacency
and impressed us with the imminence of national danger.
The crystallization of American opinion last spring is
perhaps the most striking and rapid development of public
sentiment in our history. The absorption of Czechoslovakia
and Poland and the defeat of Finland had shocked millions
of our citizens; but they had produced no conviction of dan-
ger to this country or of the necessity of an affirmative pro-
gram. The conquest of Norway, the low countries, and
France, however, produced in the brief period of a few
weeks overwhelming sentiment in favor of a colossal arm-
ament program and vigorous action against espionage and
sabotage.
But the very unanimity and vigor of opinion behind
this program have created serious dangers. This country
is still at peace and a large majority of people west of the
Atlantic seaboard see no imminent likelihood of our entry
into the war. But we have already observed symptoms of
war hysteria which in 1917 and 1918 developed only after
months of actual war conditions.
One of the chief reasons for this development, I be-
lieve, is the growth of nation-wide systems of radio broad-
casting. The radio has made the public infinitely more
susceptible to nation-wide propaganda and the skillful use
of slogans and epithets. The terms "fifth column" and "Tro-
jan horse" have caught the popular imagination more ef-
fectively than any phrases we can remember. These phrases
are symbols which provide a focus for public fears, symbols
which are the more powerful because of their vagueness.
* Dean Wilber G. Katz, University of Chicago Law School at the annual
banquet of the Indiana State Bar Association, Fort Wayne, Au-
gust 24, 1940.
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V-e have seen how convenient is the term "fifth column"
as a category in which to place anyone with whom we dis-
agree. We have seen the tcrm used with reference to Colonel
Lindbergh. However one may feel about the views he has
expressed, one cannot but be alarmed by the violence with
which he has been attacked and the utterly extravagant
character of the charges which have been made against him.
Another symptom of public hysteria has been the flood
of ill-considered proposals such as the bill to forbid employ-
ment in interstate commerce of more than one alien for every
ten citizens.
Since Ihese symptoms began to appear, Ilie Presidential
nominating conventions and the beginning of the campaign
have furnished wholesome distractions. The cautious plat-
form statements may have served to allay the public ex-
citement. In any event, I believe that there is now a lull
during which we may consider dispassionately the measures
by which we may meet the national emergency without
unnecessary restriction of individual liberties.
I believe that it is well for us to consider the experience
during and after the last war. In 1917 and 1918 Congress
and many of the states passed laws which were so general
in their prohibitions as to include virtually all public crit-
icism of the government and its policy. As Professor Cush-
man of Cornell has said, these statutes were in all too many
cases brutally enforced by our executive officers, and in a
number of cases were unintelligently interpreted and ap-
plied by the courts. For example, a man was sent to a
federal pentitentiary because he publicly advocated that the
costs of the war should be met by taxation rather than by
the issuance of bonds. Another man was convicted under
the Espionage Act and sentenced to twenty years because
he circulated a pamphlet urging the voters of Iowa not to
reelect congressmen who had voted for the draft. In 1917
a former German, who had been naturalized in 1882, re-
fused to contribute money to the Red Cross or the Y.M.C.A
and said that he did not want to aid in the defeat of Ger-
many. A federal district court revoked his naturalization
on the ground that his disloyal refusal to contribute proved
that his oath of allegiance, taken thirty-five years before,
must have been taken with mental reservations which made
it fraudulent.
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In 1920, a group of celebrated lawyers made public a
report upon illegal practices of the United States Depart-
ment of Justice, and in Jdne of that year, Charles Evans
Hughes, the present Chief Justice of the United States, re-
ferred to this report in the following terms: "Very recently,"
he said, "information has been laid by responsible citizens
at the bar of public opinion of violations of personal rights
which savour of the worst practices of tyranny."
An even stronger indictment of some of the effects of
the wartime hysteria was made by a distinguished Boston
lawyer, Moorfield Storey, a former president of the Ameri-
can Bar Association. Referring to the post-war "red-hunts,"
Mr. Storey said: "Upon a small scale a 'reign of terror'
[was produced] in which some thousands of innocent people
were . . . cruelly treated and exposed to much suffering
and loss .... No evidence was ever produced which excused
the action of the government. The safeguards of the Con-
stitution were ignored, and any true American must blush
at what was done and at the indifference in which he, and
all but a handful of his countrymen, tolerated it."
In 1920 the present Chief Justice made perhaps his
most courageous stand for the preservation of civil rights.
In that year five socialists elected to the legislature of
New York were refused their seats. Mr. Hughes headed
a delegation representing the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, and went to Albany to face a hostile
legislature and to protest against this action.
But in many respects the problems facing us today seem
more difficult than those we faced in the last war. They
are more difficult especially because we cannot know what
emergencies may arise and how soon. We only know that
our plans must be made on the basis of many alternate
assumptions, all of which would have been dismissed as
impossible even a year ago.
In the first place, there are problems in the determina-
tion of national policy. We must decide .what areas we
propose to defend. We must face without deceiving our-
selves questions about the Far East and South America.
We must consider the place of foreign trade in our economy
and the possible effects of its destruction. We must de-
cide the extent to which the preservation of our export
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trade requires central control to meet the tactics of states
under economic dictatorship.
Then there are gigantic problems of technical organiza-
tion to carry out our defense program. We must remember
that the congressional appropriations are only the first
step. We are beginning to see some of the difficulties in
the relation of this program to the production of non-war
commodities. We shall have pressing questions as to the
necessity of inroads upon freedom of enterprise in strategic
industries and upon the institutions which we have de-
veloped to handle labor relations.
A third type of problem is that of protection against
the secret agent, the spy, and the saboteur. We had our
experience with this problem in the last war, but the reve-
lations of the past two years leave no doubt that the dictator-
ships have developed methods far more insidious and suc-
cessful than those used twenty-five years ago. What Gil-
bert Murray then referred to as "the monstrous and de-
bauching power of the organized lie," has since been demon-
strated on a gigantic scale.
In facing these problems we may be tempted many
times to use the easy way, to adopt the methods of the
totalitarian states. We could have the objectives of nation-
al policy decided by a single man or a small clique. We
could solve the problems of technical organization by meth-
ods of autocratic control. There is no doubt that we could
excel in a race of dictatorships. The American genius for
organization and our vast resources could develop the most
formidable dictatorship the world has ever seen. We might
check foreign propaganda by measures including iron con-
trol of newspapers and radio. We might arrest thousands
upon suspicion of disloyalty; and if our jails are not large
enough, we might resort to the concentration camp.
But the price of such measures is to place in jeopardy
the very system which we seek to preserve. It is not merely
that we would be temporarily surrendering our traditional
liberties. The effects of such a surrender are not easily
thrown off. After the last war it took ten years; and
under the conditions of this generation who can be sure that
the return to freedom would ever be achieved?
While the spread of totalitarian doctrine has made our
problems vastly more difficult, it has also vastly increased
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our devotion to the liberties enshrined in our Bill of Rights.
Nor is this development merely a matter of public senti-
ment. It is reflected in the trend of decisions by the United
States Supreme Court. The series of opinions which have
been handed down since Hughes became Chief Justice have
recently been referred to as an "impressive arsenal of judicial
bulwarks against the violation or erosion of civil liberties."
I think that it is worth while to consider this remarkable
series of opinions.
In the Schenck case, the first of the war-time prosecu-
tions to reach the Supreme Court, it had been argued that
freedom of speech does not cover utterances which have
some tendency to cause illegal acts. Mr. Justice Holmes,
speaking for a unanimous Court, rejected this criterion of
"bad tendency" and established the rule of "clear and present
danger." "The question in every case," he said, "is whether
the words used are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress
has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and
degree."' There has never been any dissent from this
principle of clear and present danger, although the Court
has not always been unanimous in its application.
The striking development of the last twenty years has
been in cases involving state legislation. As late as 1922,
the Supreme Court said " . . . . neither the Fourteenth
Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution . .
. .imposes upon the States any restrictions about 'freedom
of speech' .... "2 Within three years, however, the con-
trary view was assumed by the Court in a series of cases
involving state anarchy or syndicalism laws.3 And in 1931,
in Stromberg v. California,4 Chief Justice Hughes regarded
it as settled that "the conception of liberty under the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embraces the
right of free speech." "The right is not an absolute one,
. . . " he added. "There is no question but that the State
1 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52, 39 Sup. Ct. 247,249 (1919).
Prudential Insurance Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543, 42 Sup. Ct.
516,522 (1922).
'Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 Sup. Ct. 625 (1925); Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 47 Sup. Ct. 641 (1927); Fiske v. Kansas,
274 U.S. 380, 47 Sup. Ct. 595 (1927).
4 283 U.S. 359, 368-9, 51 Sup. Ct. 532,535 (1931).
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may . . . . provide for the punishment of those who indulge
in utterances which . . . . threaten the overthrow of ....
government by unlawful means." But in this case the Chief
Justice spoke for a unanimous court in holding invalid a
statute forbidding the display of a red flag as a symbol of
opposition to organized government. The state court had
construed the statute to include opposition by lawful means.
At the same term of court, in Near v. Minnesota," the
majority held unconstitutional the so-called Minnesota Gag
Law. This was a statute authorizing the abatement as public
nuisances of newspapers found to be malicious, scandalous
and defamatory. The Chief Justice emphasized that the
increasing complexity of the administration of government
has made it increasingly important that we maintain a vigi-
lant and courageous press.
The next important case reached the Supreme Court
in 1936. By that time, developments in Europe, and also
some ominous signs in this country, had caused the public
to be increasingly concerned about the danger to free gov-
ernment. The Supreme Court had before it a Louisiana
statute imposing a tax on the gross receipts of large news-
papers. The purpose of the tax was disclosed in a circular
distributed over the signature of Huey Long. "The lying
newspapers," he said, "are continuing a vicious campaign
... . We managed to take care of that element here last
week. A tax of 2 per cent on what newspapers take in was
placed upon them. That will help their lying some."
Mr. Justice Sutherland spoke for a unanimous Court
in holding this tax invalid as a violation of freedom of the
press. "It is bad," he said, "because, in the light of its
history and of its present setting, it is seen to be a deliberate
and calculated device .... to limit the circulation of informa-
tion to which the public is entitled .... A free press stands
as one of the great interpreters between the government and
the people. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves." 6
In 1937, ini DeJonge v. Oregon,7 the Court unanimously
reversed a conviction under the Oregon Criminal Syndicalism
Law. The defendant had been charged with participating
5 283 U.S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625 (1931).
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250, 56 Sup. Ct. 444,449
(1936).
7 299 U.S. 353, 364-65, 57 Sup. Ct. 255,260 (1937).
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in a meeting called by the Communist Party, and while it
was assumed in the opinion that the Communist Party ad-
vocates the use of violence in the overthrow of government,
and while the defendant was a member of the party, there
was no proof that violence had been advocated in the meet-
ing referred to in the indictment. The language of the Chief
Justice reflects the increasing concern of thoughtful people
for the safety of our institutions. He said, "The greater
the importance of safeguarding the community from incite-
ments to the overthrow of our institutions by .... violence,
the more imperative is the need to preserve .... constitutional
rights . . . . in order to maintain the opportunity for free
political discussion, to the end that government may be
responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if
desired, may be obtained by peaceable means. Therein lies
the security of the Republic, the very foundation of con-
stitutional government."
In June 1939, the Court decided the celebrated case of
Hague v. The C.I.O.' This was a suit brought by the union
and some of its officers, alleging that Mayor Hague had
prevented their holding meetings in Jersey City and dis-
tributing circulars and pamphlets. The suit was to enjoin
the continuance of this conduct. The defendants relied upon
an ordinance providing that no public assembly might be
held without a permit from the Director of Public Safety.
The ordinance authorized the Director to refuse a permit
when he believed such action proper for the purpose of pre-
venting riots or disorderly assembly. This ordinance was
held unconstitutional by a vote of five to two. On the appeal
the Committee on the Bill of Rights of the American Bar
Association had intervened as friends of the Court, sup-
porting the right of freedom of assembly.
The work of the Supreme Court in protecting civil rights
was continued in the term of court just completed. Last
November four handbill ordinances were held invalid in an
opinion in which Mr. Justice Roberts spoke for a majority of
eight.0 The Court decided that the purpose to keep the
streets clean is insufficient to justify an ordinance which
prohibits a person from handing literature to one willing to
receive it. The opinion is important, furthermore, for the
8 307 U.S. 496, 59 Sup. Ct. 954 (1939).
9 SchIeider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 60 Sup. Ct. 146 (1939).
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emphatic statement which it contains contrasting the func-
tion of the Court in civil rights cases with that in other con-
stitutional cases. The court said: "Mere legislative prefer-
ences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may
well support regulation directed at other personal activities,
but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exer-
cise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic in-
stitutions. And so, as the cases arise, the delicate and dif-
ficult task falls upon the courts to weigh the circumstances
and to appraise . . . . the reasons advanced in support of the
regulation .... "
In May, Mr. Justice Murphy spoke for the same majority
in holding that freedom of speech was violated by the drastic
anti-picketing statute of Alabama and a similar ordinance
of a California city.10
Later in the same month, the Court handed down what
is perhaps its most striking civil rights decision. In Cant-
well v. Connecticut,"' it unanimously held unconstitutional
as an invasion of religious liberty an ordinance forbidding
solicitation for charitable or religious purposes without a
permit. Under the ordinance, permits were to be issued
only after a finding by the Secretary of the Public Welfare
Council that the cause was a religious one. The defendants
were members of Jehovah's Witnesses, a group which is ac-
tively opposed to organized religious, Protestant and Cath-
olic alike. They were engaged in house to house canvassing,
equipped with a portable phonograph and a set of records,
as well as books and pamphlets. The phonograph records
consisted of descriptions of the books which the defendants
were attempting to sell. It was their custom to ask per-
mission to play one of the records and then to solicit the
purchase of the book.
Cantwell was convicted for inciting a breach of the peace
as well as for violation of the ordinance requiring a permit.
It appeared that the defendants were operating in a neigh-
borhood where about ninety per cent of the residents were
Roman Catholics. They stopped two men on the street and
were given permission to play one of their records. "The
record described a book entitled "Enemies," and included an
attack upon the Catholic church. The men who were ap-
'oThornlhill v. Alabama, 60 Sup. Ct. 736 (U.S., 1940).
1160 Sup. Ct. 900 (U.S., 1940).
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proached testified that they were incensed by the contents
of the record and were tempted to strike Cantwell. But on
being told to be off, Cantwell immediately packed up his bag
and left. There was no evidence that he was personally of-
fensive or entered into any argument.
Mr. Justice Roberts used the following language in set-
ting aside the conviction for inciting breach of peace: "In
the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief,
sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man
may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade
others to his own point of view, the pleader . . . .at times,
resorts to . . . . vilification of men . . . . prominent in
Church or State, and even to false statement. But the peo-
ple of this nation have ordained in the light of history, that,
in spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these lib-
erties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion
and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy."
The Supreme Court's strong plea for tolerance-even of
the preaching of intolerance--came at a most critical time.
Popular irritation against the activities of Jehovah's Wit-
nesses had reached the boiling point in many communities.
In a single month, while the case was pending, there were
some fifty incidents of mob lawlessness against members of
the sect in twenty states, in every section of the country.
Whether these attacks resulted from the militant religious
policy of the group or from their pacifism, or their unwilling-
ness to engage in flag salutes, it is difficult to say. But
in any event, the inability of many of our citizens to main-
tain their sense of proportion or to exercise self-restraint
constitutes one of the most alarming signs of the times. We
need to remember the words of Mr. Justic Holmes, that free-
dom of thought means not "free thought for those who agree
with us, but freedom for the thought that we hate."12
I have traced the fifteen year record of growing vigi-
lance on the part of the Superior Court in the protection of
civil rights. The American Bar has had an important part
in this rejuvenation of traditional American liberties and in
the discussion of their relation to national defense. I have
already referred to the Committee on the Bill of Rights of
the American Bar Association. The Committee has been in
12 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654, 49 Sup. Ct. 448,451
(1929).
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existence for only two years, but in this period it has been
of great service in the development of public opinion on
these subjects.
The work of this Committee has been three-fold. Its
iniervention in the Jersey City freedom of assembly case was
widely praised in newspapers representing all shades of opin-
ion. The Committee also intervened in the flag salute case
to which I shall refer. It is now considering intervention in
a case which might test the right of an employer freely to
express lis opinion to his employees with respect to union-
ization or the choice of a particular union. Let me say in
).asing that I hope that this right will soon be conceded or
tesied out. For if prohibitions of picketing are invalid as
invasions of freedom of speech, the same would seem to be
true of regulations denying to employers the right to express
their opinions. In either case abuse should be checked by
measures short of prohibition.
A second type of activity of the American Bar Commit-
tee has been in furthering the organization and work of spe-
cial state and local bar association committees in this field.
There are now fifty-one such groups, including your own
committee under the chairmanship of Mr. W. J. Murray, and
that of the Indianapolis Bar Association under the leadership
of Mr. Walter Myers. Some of these state and local com-
mittees have done work of the very greatest value. I might
mention, particularly, the Chicago Bar Association Civil
Rights Committee, with whose work I am familiar. Its chair-
man, Mr. Willard L. King, has recently been cited by the
Chicago Civil Liberties Committee for distinguished service
in the cause of civil liberty in Chicago.
The American Bar Association Committee has also an
educational program. According to one of its spokesmen,
this program may well become "the organized bar's greatest
contribution in the preservation of the 'American way.'
One of the most striking features of this program is the
publication of a. new quarterly, The Bill of Rights Review.
The first issue of this magazine was published in June.. It
contains statements of leading members of the bar which are
well worth your attention. I recommend particularly the
statement of Mr. Arthur T. Vanderbilt, former President of
the Association, who said: "As we glance at the terrible
things that are happening . . . . abroad, as we look back
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over the course of history, as we reflect on the strange cases
of intolerance or worse that our own courts have had to
deal with, is it not clearly demonstrated that there is no
task of the lawyer that can equal in fundamental importance
the preservation of the rights of the citizen as guaranteed
by the First Amendment?"
Why have I spent so much time tracing the recent de-
velopments in the protection of civil rights and the contribu-
tion of lawyers to this cause? It is because I think that this
tendency furnishes substantial hope that our gigantic prob-
lems of national defense will be solved without undue sacri-
fice of individual rights. But we have come to realize that
avoiding unnecessary restriction is not enough. We are con-
vinced that a positive program is necessary not only to check
subversive activities of foreign governments but also to pro-
mote loyalty to American institutions. Of particular inter-
est, therefore, are the decisions dealing with legislative ef-
forts in this direction. In the present setting, the question
decided in 1923 in Meyer v. Nebrask1 3 appears in a new
light. In this case the Court struck down a law forbidding
foreign language teaching in grammar schools. Justices
Holmes and Sutherland dissented on the ground that such
regulations might be viewed as reasonable efforts to promote
national unity through the use of a common language.
Even more striking is this decision when it is contrasted
with the action of the Court last June in Minersville School
District v. Gobitis.14 Here the Court upheld a regulation re-
quiring daily flag salute by students in public schools. The
regulation was attacked by children of a family affiliated
with Jehovah's Witnesses, who believe that the salute vio-
lates the biblican injunction against idolatry. It was at-
tacked more generally as an unprecedented requirement of
affirmative expressions of opinion. Again the Committee
on the Bill of Rights of the American Bar Association filed
a brief in support of the attack.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated the question as one of
peculiar solemnity, as a question concerning the validity of
a legislative effort to promote "national cohesion, to safe-
guard the nation's fellowship," to develop "that unifying
sentiment without which there can ultimately be no liberty,
15 262 U.S. 390, 43 Sup. Ct. 625 (1923).
1460 Sup. Ct. 1010 (U.S., 1940).
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civil or religious." He characterized this objective as "an
interest inferior to none in the hierarchy of legal values.
National unity is the basis of national security." In their
efforts to promote this end the Court held that legislatures
should have much freedom of action.
Mr. Justice Stone alone dissented. "History teaches us,"
he said, "that there have been but few infringements of per-
sonal liberty by the state which have not been justified, as
they are here, in the name of righteousness and the public
good." "While expressions of loyalty, voluntarily given, may
promote national unity, it is quite another matter to say
that their compulsory expression by children in violation of
. * **religious conviction can be regarded as playing so
important a part in our national unity as to leave school
boards free to exact it despite the constitutional guarantee
of religious freedom."
These cases present, it seems to me, exceedingly close
questions of judgment. If I should express my own opinion
it would be in favor of the dissent in each case. I believe
that the assimilation of various national groups is an object-
ive of increasing importance and that reasonable efforts to
promote this end by checking the use of foreign languages
should be sustained. Of much less importance, I believe, was
the question in the flag salute case. The exemption of re-
ligious objectors from such observances would not seriously
impede the development of patriotic sentiments among the
school children.
But efforts such as these are certainly insufficient to
promote the deepest loyalty. If loyalty is to be more than a
passing sentiment or thrill it must result from a profound
sense of values jointly cherished, of principles shared by
citizens of our country. Education and free discussion of
the principles of democracy will go farther in developing
real loyalty than compulsory flag salutes. It will go farther
than the exclusion from our universities of students who are
not yet convinced that democracy is the ideal form of gov-
ernment. The development of such loyalty must remain a
leading objective in our program of national defense.
We must seek to understand more profoundly what it is
that we are defending and why it is worth the effort which
we are making. We have heard much about the democratic
way of life, but are we clear about the principles upon which
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it rests and the specific respects in which it differs from the
systems which we hate and fear? As Mr. Vanderbilt has
said, we need to face fundamental questions as to the rela-
tion of the state and the individual, as to the purposes of
the state and the ideals and aims of individual life. Now
these are questions of moral and political philsophy, and
for well over a half century educated Americans have neg-
lected them. This was not always so. In the early days of
the country, its leaders and educated citizens in general read
widely the classic works in political philosophy. But we have
grown up in an age in which science and scientific method
have dominated intellectual life; we have often sneered at
philosophical questions since they cannot be answered by
the methods of scientific investigation. In our universities,
the departments of government have been concerned increas-
ingly with the mechanics of power politics. Political science
has largely become a study of who gets what and how. Po-
litical theory, as it was widely studied and discussed in the
first decades of our country's history, has been all but for-
gotten.
We need to analyze the meaning of freedom. Let me
borrow the words of one of your favorite, though long ab-
sent, sons. Wendell Willkie put at the head of his statement
of principles the proposition that the purpose of government
is to make men free. But what is this human freedom that
is the purpose of government? Is it simply the absence of
constraint or coercion, the freedom to do as you please, to
come and go and to eat and drink? This was not the view
of the founders of our country. In the language of Mr.
Justice Brandeis, "Those who won our independence believed
that the final end of the State was to make men free to de-
velop their faculties." He was speaking of freedom to pur-
sue the ultimate happiness of man, the full development of
the intellectual and moral powers that make us men.
We need to analyze other concepts basic to our Ameri-
can faith. Philosophers have told us that the state enables
the individual to seek happiness by promoting the common
good, which is peace, order, and justice. And justice is pro-
moted through the rule of law. But do we mean this? Is
the common good anything but a pious phrase to hide the
conflicts of individual and class desires? Has justice any
real meaning except in terms of the interest of the stronger?
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Is law anything but what the courts and the enforcement
oificers will do in fact? It is questions such as these that
we must face and answer before we can be confident of our
devotion to democracy and our ability to promote the deepest
loyalty among our citizens.
While the development of such loyalty is a vital part of
our defense program, it is not the only part. What of the
more immediate measure for checking subversive activities?
We must of course push ahead with both zeal and intelligence
the work of investigating the activities of foreign interests.
We are agri-ed that this work must be in the hands of re-
sponsible officials and not of private vigilantes; and we real-
ize that the officials must have adequate powers. In this
country, we have Intherto been free from the kind of police
surveillance which has been accepted as routine in most Eu-
ropean countries. There are dangers, of course, in any steps
which we take in this direction, but in time of national peril
I do not think that we can defend a right of privacy from
governmental scrutiny and inquiry.
Take for example the recent act for the registration
and fingerprinting of aliens. We can understand the feeling
akin to terror which this inspires in the hearts of many ref-
ugees from central Europe. There is still too clearly imprint-
ed in their minds a picture of the methods of secret police
and the horrors of concentration camps. We should see to
it that such legislation is administered with all intelligence
and consideration; many of the aliens to be registered are
loyal persons who have declared their intention of becoming
American citizens. But even such aliens should be willing
to accept considerable inconvenience in order to aid in our
efforts to locate and deal with activities which may endanger
us all.
We cannot assume, of course, that the most dangerous
activities are to be found among aliens. And if the experi-
ence of the Department of Justice indicates that steps such
as the registration and fingerprinting of citizens is necessary
in order effectively to carry out their work, I believe that
all of us should accept such legislation as a necessary evil.
For protection against the obvious dangers of such measures,
we must see to it that its administration is in the hands of
men whose devotion to American liberties is not open to
question. In this connection the record of Attorney General
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Jackson goes back to the last war when as City Attorney of
Jamestown, New York, he made a courageous stand for a
sane enforcement of wartime legislation.
I think that I should approve also the Voorhis Bill for
the registration of certain organizations and the filing of
information concerning their activities. The Bill applies to
organizations which engage in both political activity and
what is referred to as civilian military activity, including
the training of its members in the use of firearms or en-
gaging in military drill or parades. Registration is also re-
quired of organizations which engage in either political or
military activity if they are subject to foreign control; that
is, if they accept financial contributions from any foreign
government or political party, or if their policies are deter-
mined at the suggestion of or in collaboration with any such
foreign interest. I believe that we should have full informa-
tion as to the activities of such organizations.
We must have not only investigation but also relentless
prosecution of criminal acts which threaten our defense pro-
gram. It may be that new statutes are necessary; our crim-
inal laws must keep pace with the ingenuity of possible ene-
mies. But the investigations of the Department of Justice
should make it possible to define in reasonably specific terms
the activities prohibited. The capacity of the American Bar
should be equal to the task of drafting statutes which will
meet the actual dangers without using language so sweeping
that it may prohibit legitimate expression of opinion. We
learned during the last war that, when popular feeling runs
high, juries, and even federal judges, cannot always be relied
upon to give a fair application to vaguely worded criminal
statutes.
In any new criminal legislation I believe that we should
be careful to preserve the right of free public criticism of
government officers. In the months to come, we will need
criticism as well as support. We cannot assume that the
development of our program of national defense will always
take the wisest form or that government departments will
always operate at maximum efficiency. As Professor Cush-
man has recently put it, "This right of public criticism must
be preserved because we cannot safely destroy it. If the
things which have happened in British and French politics
have any lesson for this country it is to emphasize the folly
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of assuming that because the nation is in peril the govern-
rient in power is always right. To stifle free public criticism
in a time of national danger may be to protect the incompe-
tence which may cost the nation its life. We cannot afford
to run that risk."
In the months to come we shall have many demands for
the complete suppression of unpopular groups. Man3 (if our
citizens will not be satisfied with a policy of closely scrutin-
izing the activities of bodies such as the Communist Party
and the German-American Bund, and the policy of taking
action only against specific unlawful practices. There will
b, stronger clamor for a policy which might turn such or-
ganizations into secret conspiracies whose underground ac-
tivities would be more difficult to unearth and combat.
In considering such proposals I think that we must rec-
ognize that today there is little danger that sympathy with
the Nazi cause may gain substantial headway in this country
in the near future. In the hey-day of the Ku Klux Klan or
that of Father Coughlin and Huey Long, I should not have
said this with confidence. Today, however, the public temper
is such that the danger is not that Fascist ideology will
spread but that we shall go farther than necessary in bor-
rowing Fascist methods of suppression. Nor is there any in-
dication that sympathy for the Communist cause is spreading
at this time. First the Russian deal with Germany and then
the invasion of Finland made deep inroads in the ranks of
Communist sympathizers in this country. True, we have not
lacked apologists for these actions as well as for the German
and Italian aggressions. But in neither case are they gaining
adherents, in neither case do they constitute what the Su-
preme Court referred to as a "clear and present danger."
We may well give thought to the statement of the American
Youth Commission, of which the chairman is Owen D.
Young, former president of the General Electric Company.
As reported in "Time," the Commission counselled: "If dic-
tatorship comes- to the United States it will not be as the
result of propaganda but of economic paralysis, uncontrolled
monopoly, unemployment and poverty."
I have suggested that one of the greatest dangers con-
fronting us is the development of hysterical public sentiment.
In checking this development, I believe that the lawyers of
the country can be of the greatest help. It can be checked
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only by the counsel and example of courageous men in com-
munities, great and small, throughout the land. It is to you,
perhaps more than to any other group, that our citizens look
for leadership. You are in a position to help whip up public
fear and frenzy to a point where the demand will be irresist-
ible for measures which would make those of 1918 seem mild
by comparison. You are also in a position to counsel sanity
and calmness and to help prevent our undermining the struc-
ture of American liberty. We must remember that the ex-
cesses of the prosecutions of 1918 resulted, not so much from
the belief of responsible officers that such measures were
necessary, as from the clamor of a fear-inspired public.
Events in Europe have inspired much talk about the
inherent weakness of democracy, the inability of democracy
to defend itself. Let me remind you in closing that this is
not the first time that such pessimism has been expressed.
We need to recall other critical periods in our country's his-
tory. We need to read, for example, the history of the presi-
dencies of Washington and Adams. As we read this record,
we realize how real was the danger that the principles of
our Constitution might then have been undermined by forces
from abroad. These principles were attacked on the one
hand by the advocates of the doctrines of revolutionary
France and on the other by those who wanted to make of
our country an aristocracy of wealth. And the controversy
was by no means an academic debate.
Nor was it merely a danger to our form of government.
The maintenance of our position as an independent and sov-
ereign state amid the wars and intrigues of Europe was no
easy task. Our diplomats were given scant respect in Lon-
don and Paris; illegal attacks upon our commerce were openly
countenanced by both England and France. Both parties to
the European conflict counted upon American party strife
to advance their interests.
It was in this situation that the harassed Federalist
Party drove through Congress the famous Alien and Sedition
Laws of 1798. The first of these acts authorized the Presi-
dent to order from the country all aliens whom he thought
dangerous or suspected of any secret activity against the
government. The Sedition Act made criminal the publica-
tion of any false, scandalous or malicious statement designed
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to bring the government, the Congress or the President into
contempt or disrespect.
We need to remember the storm of opposition which the
Alien and Sedition laws evoked, and the verdict of historians
that they contributed, in large measure, to the distintegration
and defeat of the Federalist Party. We need to remember,
furthermore, that they were courageously opposed by John
Marshall, although that action jeopardized his future as a
leader of the Federalist Party. Marshall expressed his op-
position to the acts in these words: ". . . . had I been in
Congress when they passed, ..... I should have opposed
them because I think them useless; and because they are
calculated to create unnecessary discontents and jealousies
at a time when our very existence, as a nation, may depend
on our union .... "
One cannot but be impressed with the courageous lead-
ership which could see in those difficult times that our union
and strength are promoted by the maintenance of freedom
of discussion. Here was ground upon which Marshall and
Jefferson could stand together. To be sure, in 1798, civiliza-
tion had not yet refined the instruments of warfare or of
propaganda which we have today. But in view of the weak-
ness of the infant republic, who can say that the threats from
abroad were less serious than they are today. We can still
afford to listen to the words of Jefferson's first inaugural
with which I close.
"If there be any among us who wish to dissolve this
union, or to change its republican form, let them stand undis-
turbed, as monuments of the safety with which error of opin-
ion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it.
I know indeed that some honest men have feared that a re-
publican government cannot be strong; that this government
is not strong enough. But would the honest patriot, in the
full tide of successful experiment, abandon a government
which has so far kept us free . . . . on the theoretic . . ..
fear that this government, the world's best hope, may . . ..
want energy to preserve itself? I trust not. I believe this,
on the contrary, the strongest government on earth."
